not punish sin, simply as sin, (for this is the prerogative of God,) but rather because it has inflicted injury on society; but it is also true, that he dare not impose penalties, except where guilt has been contracted. Thus, in the very power delegated to, and exercised by, the magistrate, we discover traces of the connexion between sin and suffering.

But because punishment, inflicted by man, aims at reformation, it does not therefore follow that this must be the sole end of punishment inflicted by God, God may not choose to delegate to man a power of punishment which he has no right of himself to inflict, and which he would most certainly abuse were it intrusted to him. But as God has this power—and our moral nature justifies him in exercising it—he may righteously use it in his holy government It is only on the supposition that he does use it, that we can vindicate to our moral nature the dealings of God in inflicting such wide-spread misery upon mankind. Without taking this circumstance into account, we feel as if we could not justify the method of God's government to the nature which he has implanted within us.

We justify the infliction of suffering upon man, on the ground of the existence of moral evil; and we throw the blame of the moral evil upon the individual who commits it. But does some one say, that our feelings rise against this view?—we reply, that there are more solid principles in the human mind than mere floating feelings—and it is to these that we appeal. Is it insisted that we justify all this to the understanding?—we answer, that there are questions involved which do not come directly under the cognizance of the understanding, any more than questions of the beauty and deformity of objects. We reckon it enough to justify the moral character of God to that moral faculty which God has placed in our breast, and placed there for this very purpose, that it may judge of

actions and of character.

That faculty now falls under our notice.